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I attempt, within the framework of my tale—a tale that is both remarkably 
eventful and yet true to life from beginning to end—to show French society in 
the age of Louis XVI, along with its literature, prevailing sensibility and 
notable personalities, and to bring all this together in a living tableau, rich in 
implication, which provides a picture of the way the French Revolution came 
about. In terms of form, the book is somewhat experimental, and I am 
naturally curious to see how it will be received by the public. 
 
The person speaking is Antal (‘Toni’) Szerb (2009:16), introducing a book entitled The 
Queen’s Necklace which he wrote between 1941 and 1942, and which was found among 
his papers after his death. Antal Szerb was starved, exhausted and beaten to death in the 
Nazi labour camp of Balf, western Hungary, in 1945. ‘Sadly, Toni Szerb is no longer 
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with us here; we buried him yesterday’, wrote fellow-inmate, the Hungarian poet Gabor 
Halasz, on January 31
st
, 1945. Szerb was 43 years old. 
 I had not heard of Antal Szerb before coming across a review in the Times 
Literary Supplement (Scurr 2009). But I was immediately attracted to the voice: how it 
managed complex but fluid sentences; how it conveyed a personality I was interested to 
engage with further. This chapter is an interrogation of the nature of such an attraction. 
What am I attracted to when I’m attracted to Szerb’s writing? Am I able, through my 
attraction, to fulfil social-scientific and also ethical purposes? 
 The chapter engages with a number of themes that this volume treats as key: our 
responsibility towards data; the specificity of data—how it will likely concern telling 
details, paradox and obscurity more than patterns or coherency; the longevity of data, 
their capacity to endure, not only in material archives but also in memory and 
imagination; and the ambiguity of data, always calling for their being interpreted in the 
contexts of present lives and persons. One cannot presume to share the life of another. 
Yet traces of past voices seem to call out to the present. What kind of justice is their due, 
and what may now be accorded? I want to suggest a tripartite response that combines (i) a 
human-scientific retrieval of data with (ii) a personal-sympathetic engagement and (iii) an 
application of data towards ethical and civilizational ends. 
 The data of human science do not change. They comprise, as A. M. MacIver 
(1961:187) spelled it out for History, the countless actual doings of countless individuals. 
What do change are the circumstances in which the human scientist must live with the 
data and do them justice. In the landscape of contemporary research practice I want to 
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make the claim, for Anthropology, that any synoptic account continues to be true or false 
in proportion to its representing or misrepresenting individual doings.  
The present is always a critical moment for making sense of data. The poet W. H. 
Auden (1951:47) called the present ‘polemical’, a moment in which an individual 
‘battles’ on two fronts: against his or her construal of the past, and against the present of 
others, their world-views and life-projects. My data in this chapter are the textual traces 
of past individual voices. My ‘battle’ is not only to have these data inform the present, 
furnishing ourselves with their insight and comradeship, but also to provide a living 
testament to these past fragments, and to secure for the future a civilized heritage that 
comprises personal insights and styles of any estimable individuals, from all the countless 
individuals of humanity past and present.  
 
The voices of Antal Szerb and W. G. Sebald 
Antal Szerb wrote novels, anthologised poems, and composed studies of literary history 
and theory. Elected President of the Hungarian Literary Academy in 1933 —aged only 
32— he became Professor of Literature at the University of Szeged in 1937. But then his 
History of Hungarian Literature and History of World Literature were banned, with the 
onset of the Second World War, due to his Jewish ethnic origins. A final novel, Oliver 
VII, published in 1942, had to be passed off as a translation from the English of a work by 
the (invented) A. H. Redcliff since no 'Jewish' work could be printed at the time.  
Szerb chose to remain in Hungary, despite being given opportunities to escape the 
anti-Semitic persecution as late as 1944. In 1943 he was called up to serve stints in a 
‘labour battalion’; after the German occupation of Budapest on March 19th 1944, he was 
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sacked from his job and his ‘conscription’ was made permanent. Nine months later he 
was dead.  
His last recorded writing was a letter from Balf dated December 6
th
 1944 to his 
family:  
 
My Dear Ones, I am infinitely saddened (…). Balf is awful, and we are in 
dire straits in every regard. I have no more hope left, except that the war will 
end soon; this is the only thing that keeps me alive. It is getting dark now and 
I am really not in the mood to write more. All of you, have faith that we shall 
see each other soon, and love your poor Toni. 
 
Characteristically, however, what I hear in the voice is geniality, a playfulness, a 
lightness of touch and self-irony: 
 
I expected something from literature, my redemption, let's say, because 
everyone's redemption is individually tailored and mine ought to have come 
from literature.  
It did not; nevertheless, I spent my entire youth in a happy purgatory, 
because I always felt that within minutes I would understand what I hadn't 
understood before, and then Beatrice would cast off her veil and the eternal 
city of Jerusalem would reveal itself to me. 
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It was in history, however, according to his reviewer, Ruth Scurr (2009:12), that Szerb 
found a refuge, a means to come to terms with the present ‘railway terminus of Western 
culture’. History he loved: ‘Feelingly, deeply, passionately. The way I love Italy. And tea. 
And sleep. History is my home. Or rather, perhaps, my country of refuge’ (Szerb 
2009:15). In particular, as an exile from the present, exiled from his earlier beloved 
haunts of foreign libraries, he immersed himself in the puzzle of how another exhausted 
civilization—the French Ancient Regime—arrived at its final end in 1789. As suggested 
by his translator, Len Rix, Szerb felt an abiding nostalgia for people and places that ‘time 
had simply finished with’ (cited in Scurr 2009:12)—the ‘dark people’ as the Russian 
phrasing marks them—and a sympathy, too, no doubt. Ideally, art should preserve such 
‘finished’ sensibilities threatened with anonymity. Their individuality could be redeemed 
through a sympathy that was human, universal, in the same way that a canon of world 
literature and its historical recognition could speak to everyone, regardless of the barriers 
of time and space. ‘My way’, Szerb insisted, ‘is to speak as one human being to another, 
looking to find kindred spirits and good company’ (cited in Scurr 2009:12). 
I begin this chapter with a story of Antal Szerb because, as I have said, I find his 
voice such good company. The voice suggests a personality I find congenial: it is 
immediate and individual. Yet the paradox is unavoidable: voice is ephemeral, and of 
Szerb’s there is merely a historical trace. I conjure imaginatively with verbalizations (not 
even vocalizations) which have been brutally silenced decades in the past. 
[LINE GAP INTENTIONAL] 
Seven months before Antal Szerb died, W. G. Sebald was born in the German village of 
Wertach im Allgäu (on May 18
th
 1944). His father was absent and did not reappear from 
 6 
a prisoner-of-war camp in France until 1947; he had joined the German army in 1929, 
during the poverty-stricken period following the First World War, and remained in the 
army after the Nazis came to power. The Sebalds were part of an intensely reactionary 
rural world, wedded to Bavarian traditions, wary of the alien, and they had prospered 
initially under the Third Reich. The father was to remain a detached figure during 
Sebald’s boyhood, saying nothing about the war. Only in his father's photograph albums 
was Sebald later to find evidence of the Wehrmacht’s Polish Campaign of 1939: grinning 
soldiers amid burning villages.  
Leaving Germany as a young adult, Sebald studied German language and 
literature at the Universities of Freiburg and Manchester, taking up the position of 
assistant lecturer at Manchester in 1966. He settled permanently in Britain in 1970, 
securing a lectureship at the new University of East Anglia and finally becoming 
Professor of Modern German Literature there. (He died in 2001 as a result of a car crash.) 
Sebald wrote in German, first publishing in Germany, and only then working closely with 
English translators. And he continued to see himself as a German in exile. Domicile in 
Britain, we learn, was a kind of exilic response to the silences and absences he had found 
around him as an adolescent in Germany despite the relict traces of physical destruction 
and psychical trauma. One had to break the circle of silence and search for some kind of 
redemption in memory.  
In Austerlitz (2002a), Sebald tells the story of an eponymous protagonist who 
discovers that his name is not really ‘Dafydd Elias’ and that he came to Britain in the 
‘kindertransports’ of 10,000 children for whom the British government arranged an 
escape from Nazi Germany in the late 1930s; Austerlitz sets off on a vain search for 
 7 
conclusive evidence of his parents’ ends in Nazi camps. In The Emigrants (2002c), 
Sebald had earlier traced the stories of four Jewish exiles from Nazi Germany, seeking 
new identities and belongings as doctor, painter, valet and teacher in New England. 
Contrastingly, On the Natural History of Destruction (2004a) found Sebald revisiting the 
Allied Forces’ air bombardment in the last years of World War Two, when a million 
bombs were dropped on 131 German cities, killing some 600,000 civilians and destroying 
more than seven and a half million homes. After Nature (2004b) recounted the history, as 
poem, of three men, painter Mathias Grunewald, botanist G. W. Steller and Sebald 
himself, taking the form of a comparative exploration of the burden of past uncertainties 
on present living.  
Collectively, Sebald concluded (2002b:295), ‘our history is but a long account of 
calamities’. What kind of justice does such a past demand, and what may the living 
provide? What testimony does not either reproduce lapidary statistics or else descend to 
sentimentality? At one point in Austerlitz, Sebald’s narrator is visiting the Belgian 
fortress of Breendonk, which had, between 1940 and 1944, served as a Nazi penal camp. 
Let me give an excerpt from Sebald’s (2002a:30-1) singular narrative voice: 
 
[W]hen I look back at the crab-like plan of Breendonk (…) the darkness does 
not lift but becomes yet heavier as I think how little we can hold in mind, how 
everything is constantly lapsing into oblivion with every extinguished life, 
how the world is, as it were, draining itself, in that the history of countless 
places and objects which themselves have no power of memory is never 
heard, never described or passed on. Histories, for instance, like those of the 
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straw mattresses which lay, shadow-like, on the stacked plank beds and which 
had become thinner and shorter because the chaff in them disintegrated over 
the years, shrunken—and now, in writing this, I do remember that such an 
idea occurred to me at the time—as if they were the mortal frames of those 
who once lay there in that darkness. 
 
The world ages and the lost histories multiply. One cannot presume to share another's 
past sufferings—it is morally compromising to appropriate tragic memories, Sebald 
insists—and yet voices seem to call out to the present even from the inanimate detritus of 
past lives. To consider the historical void of extinguished life is to risk ‘vertigo’, as 
Sebald (1999) titled another work.  
[LINE GAP INTENTIONAL] 
Voice, history and vertigo make up my theme. When, in the words of MacIver 
(1961:188), ‘an ideal written history would tell the whole story of everything that ever 
happened to every human being’, how is a human science to do justice to individual lives 
that lapse constantly into oblivion? The situation is a fraught one when the professional 
conditions of work for the human scientist are characterised by a form of category-
thinking that validates the individual only as it manifests membership of a social or 
cultural class (Rapport 2012: 7ff.); we are encouraged today to see individual lives 
primarily as cultural constructs that emanate from social relations. 
My method is to take advantage of the paradoxical nature of voice; also to exploit 
an idea aptly expressed by G. K. Chesterton (1936: 128) that ‘imagination has its highest 
use in a retrospective realization. The trumpet of imagination (…) calls the dead out of 
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their graves’. One does justice to dead voices, I shall say, by imagining them into 
conversation. 
 
The silent character of voice 
What is the nature of the human voice? There is a very suggestive passage in Virginia 
Woolf’s novel of historical transcendence, Orlando, where she describes the diversity of 
which an individual is likely to be composed. A multitude of different people or selves 
lodges in one human spirit, she writes (1980:192-3), each with different sympathies, 
attachments, rights and contributions. Hence the range of characters one person can 
comprise and the ephemerality of expression of each: one only comes when it rains, 
another in a room with green curtains, another when Mrs Jones is not there, another with 
a promise of a glass of wine. Each self makes different terms regulating its appearance. 
Perhaps, Woolf concludes (1980:196), people talk aloud only because their different 
selves are conscious of disseverment and are trying to communicate one with another: 
when communication is again established, they fall silent. 
 Woolf’s primary concern is that of the biographer (here, of ‘Orlando’): how does 
one deal with the multiplexity of a subject when their versions may number in the 
thousands? But her observations can also inform a characterization of voice. One cannot 
assume that one knows another by virtue of what they appear to say. To the contrary what 
they say aloud is likely to represent a tiny proportion of their voicings, most of which will 
remain silent and comprise that internal dialogue that is the constant accompaniment of 
human consciousness. To phrase this somewhat differently, an individual life is party to 
unvoiced as well as voiced verbal expression. It is likely that what is unvoiced will 
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comprise by far a greater quantity of expression: what breaks the surface of the self is, 
like the tip of the iceberg, only a tiny proportion. It is very possible that what we hold to 
be dearest and truest and most personal we are most loath to give up to public scrutiny: 
indeed, what is dearest and truest and most personal is that which is hardest to enunciate 
in public language. It is certainly the case that to comprehend what a person speaks, to 
apprehend its significance fully and most truly, it would be necessary to contextualise it 
by way of everything that that individual is at the same time not saying aloud (Rapport 
1993). At its core, human science becomes an imaginative and intuitive exercise as it 
attempts to overcome the radical disjuncture that exists between the traces of self that 
appear in voiced form and that which remains unvoiced: the human scientist must 
perforce animate the exterior traces of selfhood with an imaginative construction of the 
interiority of his or her research subject (Rapport 2007, 2008). 
 Not only is voice ephemeral in nature, moreover, a momentary expression of self 
(albeit that the verbalization may be recorded, even written to begin with), but its 
character may be described as inherently tricksterish. Is what another hears a true, entire, 
open and plain expression? Very likely not. Such expression is, indeed, very likely 
impossible. The relationship between voice and individual identity is always an 
ambiguous one, complex and partial. One might speak of disjuncture or fracture between 
the two. One might say that individual voice is always mediated by the rhetorics of 
silence. Moreover, ambiguity and complexity increases since the gratuitousness of an 
individual’s inherently interior consciousness is not the only element in the disjunctive 
silence. Let me examine the silent character of voice a little further. 
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‘Useless knowledge’ was a phrase made famous by Charlotte Delbo (1995), 
concerning her time spent in Auschwitz-Birkenau as a Communist member of the French 
Resistance. What use is it to know, as a result of Lager experiences, that hunger makes 
human eyes sparkle while thirst dulls them; or that at night one hopes for life but come 
the morning one hopes for death; or that when one witnesses the body of one’s murdered 
mother one is not necessarily brought to tears. This kind of knowledge must be 
unrehearsed and unlearned, Delbo concludes, if one wishes to go on living: the evil is 
inexpressible. 
 Delbo’s insight introduces us to a range of circumstances that make it impossible 
or inappropriate to voice that which one knows and could express and might otherwise 
feel a need to express. There are all manner of situations of mood and temperament, of 
politeness and taboo, as well as what might be termed extreme otherness or alienness, 
such as the atrocities of war, which militate against the voicing of personal knowledge. 
How appropriate is it to tell one’s spouse that their ageing lessens their attractiveness in 
your eyes? Is it not the case that, in the novelist’s words, ‘in human relations kindness 
and lies are worth a thousand truths’ (Greene 1974:58). Likewise, there is, according to 
anthropologist Richard Fardon (2008:251), a ‘social logics of action’ which might make 
it inappropriate to voice abroad social facts that figure prominently in Western 
expectations of liberal sociality: how useful are proclamations of Western liberties to the 
African peasant farmer, the citizen of the tyrannous Asian regime, the veiled Middle-
Eastern female, to whom the knowledge risks exacerbating senses of exclusion and 
disparagement. It may be the case that humans are a single species and that cultures are 
contingent symbolic constructs, but the complexities of political loyalties and inequalities 
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may necessitate the silencing of such truths in favour of strategic relativism and 
essentialism and communitarianism. More mundanely, a social system may be based on the 
tabooed expression of true feeling between spouses and their in-laws, or between junior and 
elder; and a complex organization—a hospital, an orchestra—may be based on a purported 
ignorance in one section or level of what is truly felt or experienced within another. It 
might be inappropriate, for the functional effectiveness of the organisational whole, that the 
doctor or the conductor hears what the porter or the percussionist truly feels about their role 
or their performance. 
 There is, in short, a politics to silence, a culture and a sociality and a personal 
temper to silence. Meaning and identity are not truly voiced, things are not said, because 
of shyness and laziness and kindness, because of mannerliness and convention, because 
of political expediency, because of social functionality. Even should an individual give 
voice, one is not necessarily vouchsafed a release from ambiguity concerning its true or 
full meaning. As has already been suggested, if the original context of a person’s words is 
their personal world-views—the selves and landscapes in which they construe themselves 
consciously to be living and acting (Rapport 1993, 2003)—then the social context of their 
expression will always be a diminishment. Individuals express themselves, externalise 
themselves, by way of symbolic languages of one kind or another (words, paints, clothes, 
actions) whose meanings are ever a matter of approximate, formal interpretation by 
others than their original speakers. 
If what I have dubbed the rhetorics of silence advances a likelihood of 
miscommunication, of the hearer misconstruing what the voice of the speaker intends to 
convey by his or her symbolic usage, then the cases of deliberate misdirection, of 
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feigning meaning, only add to the ambiguity surrounding voice. How often is it the case 
that the individual will put on a voice that is not essentially his or her own for the purpose 
of playing a role. It might be argued that a large part of social relationality is role-playing: 
one relates to those around one by passing oneself off as that which convention or 
manners dictate. Passing becomes the social norm as a means for individuals to deal 
quickly, routinely and effectively with the host of others and the host of situations whose 
negotiation they must manage in ever moving their lives forward (Rapport 2010).  
Even should one intend to speak plainly, and intend to be understood fully, the 
opinion that one voices in one minute might not always hold for the next. In this way the 
ephemerality of voice concerns not just the medium of its expression—breath, sound 
recordings, words on paper—but also extends to that which is conveyed: does the 
individual give voice to a world-view that has any abiding authenticity for them? 
In sum: Voice is ephemeral and tricksterish, and surrounded by silence. The 
relation between voice and identity is never unambiguous. One cannot will one’s way to a 
direct apprehension of another, nor a full comprehension. Putting on voices, distorting 
voices, mishearing voices, misremembering voices … what is left of that tantalizing 
attractiveness, the initial promise of personality to which voice inhered? Except to say 
that to anticipate and to mine this ambiguity and plurality is for the human scientist ‘best 
practice’: the best that can be hoped for in the intrinsically fictional business of seeking to 
know other human beings. And to say that the irreducible complexity and diversity 
intrinsic to the search in itself evidences fundamental qualities of humanity. 
 
Digression: The conversation of civilization 
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In a celebrated essay, 'The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind', philosopher 
Michael Oakeshott (1962) identified different kinds of human consciousness, which he 
called 'idioms'. Practical activity was one idiom, concerning itself with desiring and 
obtaining. Science was a second (inquiring and understanding) and poetry was a third 
(contemplating and delighting). The idioms pertained to different aspects of our 
humanity, Oakeshott explained, to different ‘voices’. Here were different ways of our 
being human and displaying a human awareness.  
 We need not expect all human voices to be as conversant or fluent in the same 
idiom, Oakeshott continued; certainly not at the same time. Nor should the differences 
between idioms be thought of as disagreement. Science, poetry and practice were 
different ‘species’ of awareness: they led adjacent lives in the environment of human 
being and they were not in a hierarchy. Indeed, here was a variety and a complexity we 
might wish to celebrate; certainly not to diminish. That we human animals could conjure 
with knowledge (‘science’), with beauty (‘poetry’) and with gratification (‘practice’), 
with equal ease and likelihood of achievement, and yet with very different kinds of 
conscious awareness and expressiveness, was perhaps the identifying characteristic of our 
species. 
 ‘Civilitude’, for Oakeshott, delineated an appreciation, both on an individual level 
and a collective one, of the range of our possible human modes of conscious awareness. 
To be ‘civil’, individuals and groups needed to educate themselves in the diversity of 
human achievements: become versed in their historical development, their particular 
distinctivenesses, and their human uniformity. For science, poetry and practice—our very 
different ways of being in the world—developed alike from general human capacities.  
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 Oakeshott called the civil appreciation and coming-together of human 
achievements the ‘conversation’ of humankind: human civilization was this conversation, 
a manifold of different voices. The voices in the conversation did not comprise any 
simple hierarchy—reason was not sovereign or alone, and neither was sentiment or 
will—and nor did the conversation amount to an argument. The conversation of 
humankind was essentially that: a meeting point of humane voices, a civil coming-
together of all kinds of awareness.  
 Civilization manifested itself, then, in a continuing conversation which was more 
than an inquiry or a contest or an exegesis or a debate, or even an accumulating body of 
information. It contained all of these, and more, but these were rather passages within the 
whole. The conversation posited no necessary claims to disinter truth, to prove 
propositions or to reach conclusions: it did not seek to persuade, refute or inform. Rather, 
the conversation amounted to a record of human achievement in its diversity and 
complexity; it embodied both the generality and the particularities of human capacity to 
act in and on the world. 
 Oakeshott considered the idea of ‘the conversation of mankind’ to be of more than 
merely historical interest. He believed that versed in the conversation individuals and 
groups might be further provoked. The conversation was a human inheritance but also a 
context for future expression, affording 'place and character to every human activity and 
utterance' (1962:199). It is in this sense that Oakeshott has been described as a 
conservative philosopher: he appreciated the way that the past might contextualise the 
present. But he also recognized the human capacity for radical engagement, for 
transforming what is given by history. This was why he characterised the conversation of 
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mankind as an unrehearsed intellectual adventure: 'thoughts of different species take wing 
and play round one another' (1962:198). Responding to and provoked by what they find 
being conversed, the voices of different individuals, and the voices of the same 
individuals in different idioms, obliquely correspond to one another without assimilation. 
Science did not become poetry which did not become practicality: just as Oakeshott’s 
own voice was no one else’s, and Oakeshott the philosopher did not necessarily speak 
with the same voice as Oakeshott the lover of horse-racing. The different ways of being 
human did not reduce to one another, just as different individuals did not. Nevertheless, 
being all human, there was a sense in which they breathed the same air. Taking wing, 
they related to one another playfully, obliquely, in flight. 
 Oakeshott's notion of ‘humane conversation’ is a complex one. I find it both 
moving and provocative. To employ his own terms I believe it was a notion in which 
Oakeshott himself vested a number of voices. He felt it to be true historically; he found it 
to be apt aesthetically; he wished for it to be seen as having practical import. To attend to 
the conversation of humankind was to secure a civil society that was historically lodged, 
cognisant of the different spheres of the human, and respectful of those individually 
embodied capacities from which our achievements in science, poetry and practice derive. 
Proceeding simultaneously in public and within ourselves, Oakeshott concluded that such 
conversation had claims to being our greatest human accomplishment. 
[LINE GAP INTENTIONAL] 
Voice is ephemeral and tricksterish, surrounded by silence, and the relation between 
voice and identity is never unambiguous, and yet voices possess an attractiveness: in spite 
of all, I find that they retain a personality. Oakeshott’s conversational metaphor leads me 
 17 
to suggest that certain voices from the vertiginous past may yet speak to the present. The 
voices are intimate, affecting, personal. I am touched by the ‘poetry’ (in Oakeshott’s 
idiom) of Antal Szerb. I find that we converse. Certainly, the conversation is my 
imagination, my interpretation, but in it I can suppose a humanity transcendent of the 
particularities, the distances and fractures, of time and space (Rapport 2007).  
 This remains a supposition. There is no assurance to be had that the voice I take to 
be Antal Szerb’s (or any other’s) is authentically his. What personality, and whose, does 
his voice convey to me? I have no way of knowing with any certainty. But these vagaries 
of voice apply equally to living interlocutors, even those with whom I converse regularly 
and routinely. Communication is always an individual interpretation, a personal 
translation: from symbolic form to meaning; from one embodiment to another’s. For 
better or worse, however, I discriminate: this person I like, this voice I trust, and not this 
other. There are qualities in the voice of Antal Szerb that attract me and lead me to wish 
that we might further converse. Until I am led to interpret otherwise I maintain the 
assumption that Szerb’s is an ironic but not cynical personality, playful, amused and 
sceptical, psychologically informed, scholarly and humane. 
 
Imaginative conversation 
I return to W. G. Sebald’s question: What kind of testament can the present provide that 
does justice to the disappearing past which is more than a lapidary reproduction of 
statistics or a descent into sentimentality? Can I craft the past into living data concerning 
individual lives? The answer I shall suggest concerns the testimony of voice, in particular 
of voices in conversation. I would bring Antal Szerb and others into the present and 
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future by imagining the part his words might play in all manner of conversations in which 
he might have been interested to contribute. I shall write him into symposiums that might 
be held among a number of favourite historical figures of mine: they speak together on a 
particular theme that seems fitting to my understanding of the personality their voices 
convey. I shall give an example below. 
 This is not a new idea, of course. Indeed, it is ancient (cf. König 2008, Long 
2008). Plato famously sought to preserve the voice of Socrates in the third century BCE 
by means of a genre of sympotic dialogue: an imagined discussion of set speeches 
between Socrates and his pupils. The tradition continued with the likes of Plutarch, in the 
first century CE, writing Latin dialogues that reworked Hellenic sources for the purpose 
of giving depth to Roman culture. Macrobius, in the fifth century CE, had Virgil and 
other great past Latin poets speak through characters in the present for the purpose of 
demonstrating the abiding choir of Roman wisdom. Another ancient tradition sees the 
centuries-old differences of opinion between the rabbis Hillel and Shammai recorded 
dialogically in the Mishnah (Talmud) of the third century CE.  
According to Plato, the genre of sympotic dialogue was nobler than writing 
monologic texts, conveying a diversity of perspectives in such a way that conversion to 
the truth was more effective, as well as being a way to philosophic discovery as such. 
Plutarch, likewise, praised the openness of the genre. Of course, the irony involved has 
not escaped critical attention: whether the dialogues purport to be between allies or 
disputants or simply with oneself, all are in a sense monologues inasmuch as they have 
been put together by a single author. When dialogue became one of the experimental 
means of representation tried in anthropology, after a celebrated debate on ‘writing 
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culture’ called into question the notion of monologic objectivity (cf. Rapport 1997), the 
pseudo-collaborative nature of the exercise was savagely critiqued. According to Stephen 
Tyler (1986:128), the claim to represent another and to bring them into presence by way 
of pseudo-discourse is to perpetrate a totalistic illusion: indeed, a ‘terroristic alienation’ 
more complete than positivism. 
 But this is too extreme. Given that to write of another is always to ‘run the risk of 
writing fiction’ (Berger 1988:126), there is a proportionality that can be observed. My 
project is to provide a testament in the present to others’ past voices by willing that those 
voices will preserve an integrity that is their own. The context is different from their 
original expression, the context is one of my own construction, but only partly. If I 
manage the sympotic exchange with sufficient discrimination then I have the non-
censored words of each imagined interlocutor engender their own context. The 
conversation is a juxtaposition of contexts, in which the voices are heard pronouncing 
verbatim: in their own idioms, their own intonations, in a word their own personalities, on 
a theme that is of their choosing and not mine. 
 For instance, let me imagine the following humane conversation, across time and 
space, by a set of interlocutors intent alike on a disquisition concerning what I might 
entitle, ‘The anxiety and the adventure that attend upon the temporal quality of human 
existence’:  
Antal Szerb (2001:74) begins, let me suggest. He observes that ageing can 
give rise to a delirious fever, the individual aware that: 
his body was somehow caught up in slow but visible processes of change, as 
if his skin was shrivelling at the speed of a minute hand ticking round a clock. 
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To which Philip Larkin (1990:107) interjects: 
Strange to know nothing, never to be sure / Of what is true or right or real, / 
But forced to qualify or so I feel (…) for our flesh / Surrounds us with its own 
decisions (…) / That when we start to die / Have no idea why. 
It is then Virginia Woolf’s (1969:100) turn to comment: 
There is no stability in this world. Who is to say what meaning there is in 
anything? Who is to foretell the flight of a word? It is a balloon that sails 
over tree-tops. To speak of knowledge is futile. All is experiment and 
adventure. We are forever mixing ourselves with unknown quantities. 
And Franz Kafka (1983:294) can but concur: 
Nothing is granted to me, everything has to be earned, not only the present 
and the future, but the past too –something after all which perhaps every 
human being has inherited—this too must be earned; it is perhaps the hardest 
work. 
It is then Søren Kierkegaard’s (1992:214) judgement that:  
The unhappy man is always absent from himself, never present to himself. 
But E. M. Forster (1983:47-48) wonders whether this need be the case: 
We know that we come from the winds, and that we shall return to them; that 
all life is perhaps a knot, a tangle, a blemish in the eternal smoothness. But 
why should this make us unhappy? Let us rather love one another, and work 
and rejoice. I don't believe in this world sorrow. (...) [B]y the side of the 
everlasting Why there is a Yes—a  transitory Yes if you like, but a Yes. 
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The point, Friedrich Nietzsche (1997:127) argues, is to be joyous in the 
individuality of the fortuitous self: 
In his heart every man knows quite well, that being unique, he will be in the 
world only once and that no imaginable chance will for a second time gather 
together into a unity so strangely variegated an assortment as he is (…). [He 
is] uniquely himself to every last movement of his muscles, more, that in 
being thus strictly consistent in uniqueness he is beautiful, and worth 
regarding. 
To be true to this individuality, John Stuart Mill (1963:182-4) adds, is to be 
free: 
It is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the 
maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is 
for him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to 
his own circumstances and character (…) Human nature is not a machine to 
be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a 
tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the 
tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing. 
The favoured parting greeting of Ben Glaser, a refugee from Nazi Germany 
and my mother’s second husband, sums up this affirmation of the world’s 
possibilities: 
Mach es gut! 
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Yet, the freedom, the joy and love are only counterweights to the ignorance, 
instability and ageing, and also, in Stevie Smith’s (1985:120) estimation, the 
loneliness: 
Loneliness and the fear that waits upon it strikes at the physical heart, so that 
there is a pain that is physical with the physical pain of a very extreme icy 
coldness. (…) Oh death could not be more cold. And this coldness of this 
loneliness and fear carries with it its own most searching pang, the burden of 
a prophecy: I am your future. So that even the relief of death appears as a 
vain thing, and life-in-death our sole whole scope and penalty. 
So, Antal Szerb (2001:232) has the last word: 
Everyone has to find his own way to die. 
 
Coda: Context as a Conceit? 
I have said that the original context of a person’s words is their personal world-views, 
and I have admitted that the context which I provide in the above imagined conversation 
is different from the words’ original expression, Yet I have also argued that the context 
which I construct is only partly novel: that there is a way in which this sympotic 
exchange preserves the integrity of each voice. Is this more than an argumentational 
conceit?  
My way to claim both of these things as possibly true turns on an observation of 
Elizabeth Smart’s. Artistry in verbal expression, she suggested—in poetry and in prose 
and in oratory and in song—derived from ‘the passion that one word has for another’ 
(1983). The artist formulates an expression in such a way that the words possess and 
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display a distinct and necessary—and aesthetic—partnership with one another. One might 
also describe this as the artist possessing a personal signature and style. The way in which 
words are afforded ‘passion’ in their particular placement is distinctive to a writer, and is 
something to which a discriminatory ear of another may be attuned. I feel I hear Antal 
Szerb—and Stevie Smith and Friedrich Nietzsche—as himself or herself: voice inheres in 
words artistically arranged so that an individual identity and personality is also conveyed 
by their expression. It is thus that I can argue that my interlocutors’ words engender their 
own context even as their imagined conversation is a juxtaposition of contexts for which I 
am responsible. 
None of this makes any sense, however, without the grounding of a further 
context, a human one. I am attracted to the voice of Antal Szerb and others, and I can 
appreciate the artistry in their use of words—and I can conduct a human-scientific 
interrogation of this—ultimately because as individuals we yet share a humanity. Indeed, 
I would describe human science per se as an interrogation of this fundamental dialectic. 
Our human condition is a polar one; at one pole exists our individuality, at another our 
humanity. Our nature is to be irreducibly different and the same at once. The substance of 
any human life is unique while the capabilities for making that life and the liabilities to 
which that life are subject are universal. My work as a human scientist is predicated on 
this dialectic and my aim is to procure the data that will enable individuality and 
humanity to speak to one another. How has this individual life deployed the human 
capacities of which it is comprised? What does this individual embodiment make 
manifest the humanity of which it is an instantiation. My responsibility to my data is to 
see that they transcend discriminatory practices that would delimit them according to 
 24 
merely contingent, cultural categories of race, gender, religion, ethnicity, nationality, 
class. The genuine, ‘scientific’ human community is a species-wide one and it is, in Alain 
Finkielkraut’s (2001:80) humanistic aphorism, a community of individual exceptions: 
‘All the same—that is, human. Each one different—that is, in themselves. Together 
humanity forms a community of exceptions in the world’.
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